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Abstract—It had been believed in the conventional practice
that the risk of a bank going bankrupt is lessened in a straight-
forward manner by transferring the risk of loan defaults. But the
failure of American International Group in 2008 posed a more
complex aspect of financial contagion. This study presents an
extension of the asset network systemic risk model (ANWSER) to
investigate whether credit default swaps mitigate or intensify the
severity of financial contagion. A protection buyer bank transfers
the risk of every possible debtor bank default to protection
seller banks. The empirical distribution of the number of bank
bankruptcies is obtained with the extended model. Systemic
capital buffer ratio is calculated from the distribution. The ratio
quantifies the effective loss absorbency capability of the entire
financial system to force back financial contagion. The key finding
is that the leverage ratio is a good estimate of a systemic capital
buffer ratio as the backstop of a financial system. The risk
transfer from small and medium banks to big banks in an
interbank network does not mitigate the severity of financial
contagion.
I. INTRODUCTION
Understanding how the characteristics of a financial system
govern the financial contagion of bank bankruptcies is essential
in the argument to reform the capital requirement and other
regulatory standards. Recently computer simulation models
are developed to mimic the transmission of financial distress
and predict the severity of financial contagion[6], [8], [12],
[13], [15], [18], [20], [21], [25]. Both the external assets and
interbank loans of banks can be the origin of financial distress
in these models. Either distress may transmit separately in
a peace time while compound distress transmits in a crisis
time. A bank makes an investment in multiple external asset
classes. The value of the total external assets may go downturn
when the markets fluctuate. A defective investment portfolio
of banks imposes financial distress on them[11]. A failing
debtor bank becomes insolvent in paying off the interbank
borrowings. Any creditor banks suffer financial distress from
the failing debtor bank[23]. A bank goes bankrupt unless the
capital buffer absorbs the total loss from the external assets
and interbank loans. Bank bankruptcies bring about still more
financial distress repeatedly. This is the mechanism of financial
contagion.
It had been believed in the conventional practice that the
risk of a bank going bankrupt is lessened in a straightforward
manner by transferring the risk of loan defaults. But the
failure of American International Group in 2008 posed a more
complex aspect of financial contagion. AIG had sold protection
in the form of credit default swaps to insure securities worth
$441 billion. The value of the securities declined as the
subprime loan market collapsed. The credit rating of AIG
was downgraded. AIG faced a deadly liquidity crisis. The
bankruptcy of AIG would have caused catastrophic damage
to the financial system. The Fed proposed a rescue package
and the crisis ended in the unprecedented taxpayer-financed
bailout of a giant private company.
The market for CDS has been growing[1] despite the
bankers’ painful awareness that CDS are imperfect. CDS are
financial instruments for risk transfer[7] which relate three
banks. A protection seller bank compensates the loss a pro-
tection buyer bank incurs in the specified credit event of a
third-party reference bank. Risk transfer is meant to level off
the risk of individual banks. But once a severe financial distress
strikes a key seller like AIG, risk transfer does not work any
longer. A fragile financial system appears abruptly. Systemic
risk[2] is rather intensified.
This study presents an extension of the asset network sys-
temic risk model (ANWSER)[4], [10] to investigate whether
the CDS mitigate or intensify the severity of financial con-
tagion. A protection buyer bank transfers the risk of every
possible debtor bank default to protection seller banks. The
protection buyer bank may make additional loans and lend as
much as the risk-transferred interbank loans. The empirical
distribution of the number of bank bankruptcies is obtained
under these conditions with the extended model. Systemic
capital buffer ratio is calculated from the distribution. The
ratio quantifies the effective loss absorbency capability of the
entire financial system to force back financial contagion. The
extended model demonstrates how the systemic capital buffer
ratio is affected by the denseness and concentration of the
interbank network and related to the core tier 1 ratio and the
leverage ratio.
II. MODEL
Models of interbank loans, investments, and CDS are
presented in this section.
The asset network systemic risk model (ANWSER)[3] is
founded on previous computer simulation models[11], [23].
They investigate the statistical characteristics of a financial
system with a Monte-Carlo method. The Monte-Carlo method
is a broad class of a computational technique to obtain many
samples of numerical outcomes which are used to analyze the
statistical characteristics. The technique relies on a sequence
of random numbers generated repeatedly from a specified
Fig. 1. Balance sheet of the n-th bank. The balance sheet consists of interbank
loans ln, external assets en, equity capital cn, interbank borrowings bn, and
deposits dn.
Fig. 2. Balance sheet of the n-th bank after the risk transfer of interbank
loans and additional loans. The value of the additional interbank loans as a
fraction of the value of the risk-transferred interbank loans is f .
Fig. 3. Systemic capital buffer ratio γs which is calculated as a function
of γ by comparing the number of bank bankrupcies in financial systems with
risk transfer and without risk transfer.
probability distribution. The initial financial distress on banks
is the falling prices of their external assets in the market.
When a debtor bank happens to go bankrupt, the consequent
interbank loan defaults are the next financial distress to its
creditor banks. Financial distress transmits from failing debtor
banks to creditor banks repeatedly in an interbank network.
N is the number of banks. M is the number of external
assets in which an individual bank makes an investment. Fig.
1 shows the balance sheet of the n-th bank. The interbank loan
ratio θ =
∑
N
n=1
ln/
∑
N
n=1
an is the total value of interbank
loans as a fraction of the total value of assets. The assets
consist of the interbank loans ln and external assets en like
securities and government bonds. An interbank loan is the
credit relation between a creditor bank and a debtor bank which
appears when the debtor bank raises money in the interbank
market. A interbank network describes the all credit relations.
It is a directed graph which consists of banks as vertices, and
the interbank loans as edges from creditor banks to debtor
banks.
Both big banks and small banks have the same equity
capital ratio γ = cn/an. It is the same as the core tire 1
ratio t = γ and the leverage ratio l = γ. This value is the
minimal level of the equity capital ratio required by the bank
regulatory policies. The liability consists of the equity capital
cn, interbank borrowings bn, and deposits dn. The equity
capital includes common stock and disclosed reserves. These
need not be paid off and can be used to absorb the loss from
financial distress immediately.
The denseness κ of the financial system is the average
incoming or outgoing nodal degree of the interbank network
as a fraction of N−1. A more dense interbank credit network
has a larger value of κ. The concentration ρ of the financial
system is the sum of the interbank loan share of the 1 percent
top banks (the largest, the second largest, · · · , the N/100-th
largest banks). A more concentrated interbank credit network
has a larger value of ρ.
Every creditor bank buys protection in the form of CDS
which refer to the all of its debtor banks. Every interbank
loan default is compensated by one of protection seller banks.
S ≤ N is the number of protection seller banks. A protection
seller bank can be a creditor and debtor bank in the interbank
network. The risk weight of these interbank loans becomes 0%.
After this risk transfer, every creditor bank makes a borrowing
and lends additionally as much as the value of the interbank
loans whose risk was transferred. The risk of the additional
interbank loans is not transferred. Their risk weight is 100%.
The parameter f ≥ 0 specifies the value of the additional
interbank loans as a fraction of the value of the interbank
loans whose risk was transferred. Fig. 2 shows the balance
sheet after the risk transfer and additional loans.
The core tire 1 ratio t′ is given by eq.(1). The core tier 1
ratio is calculated based on the risk weighted assets.
t′ =
γ
1− θ + fθ
. (1)
The leverage ratio l′ is given by (2). The leverage ratio is
calculated based on the value of the equity capital against the
overall assets regardless of the risk.
l′ =
γ
1 + fθ
. (2)
Given N , M , and S, a sequence of random numbers is
generated to synthesize samples for fixed values of θ, γ, κ, ρ,
and f . An individual sample includes
• interbank network topology Z (an N × N matrix)
where the element Znn′ = 1 means the n′-th bank
makes a loan from the n-th bank and otherwise
Znn′ = 0
• risk transfer pattern Y (an N ×N ×N tensor) where
the element Ynn′n′′ = 1 means the n-th bank buys
protection for the loan default of the n′-th bank from
the n′′-th bank and otherwise Ynn′n′′ = 0
• investment portfolio X (an N ×M matrix) where the
element Xnm is the fraction of the investment which
the n-th bank makes in the m-th external asset class
(∑M
m=1
Xnm = 1, 0 ≤ Xnm ≤ 1)
• prices of the external assets in the market v (an M
column vector) where the element vm is the price of
the unit of the m-th external asset class.
The initial financial distress on the n-th bank is
en
∑M
m=1
Xnmvm.
A protection buyer bank goes bankrupt if the total loss from
the financial distress is not absorbed by its capital buffer. As far
as the protection buyer bank survives, the loss in capital buffer
in the event of debtor bank bankruptcies is compensated by the
CDS payoff from the protection seller banks. The protection
seller bank goes bankrupt if the sum of the total loss from the
financial distress and the CDS payoff is not absorbed by its
capital buffer. It is assumed that failing debtor banks do not
pay off any portions of the interbank loans to creditor banks.
F is the number of banks which end in bankruptcy until the
financial contagion comes to a halt. The empirical distribution
of the number of bank bankruptcies P (F ) is obtained from
those samples. The value of F is picked up at the 999-th 1000-
quantile point as the representative in case of a financial crisis.
Systemic capital buffer ratio γs is calculated by comparing
the curves for the number of bank bankruptcies F as a function
of γ in financial systems with risk transfer and without risk
transfer. The systemic capital buffer ratio refers to the equity
capital ratio in the financial system without risk transfer at
which the number of bank bankruptcies is the same as that in
the financial system with risk transfer. Fig. 3 shows how to
calculate γs as a function of γ. In this case, γs = 0.073 when
γ = 0.09. A negative impact is meant if γs < γ.
III. EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION
The experimental conditions are presented in this section.
Two cases are compared to investigate the impact of the
CDS with the model in II. In case that the risk transfer is
absent, the number of bank bankruptcies is measured for the
given value of the interbank loan ratio θ under the condition
Y = 0. In case that the risk transfer is present, the number is
measured for the calculated value of the interbank loan ratio
Fig. 4. Interbank network of N = 500. The size of a vertex represents the
value of assets of a bank. The width of an edge represents the value of an
interbank loan between the banks at its ends.
θ′ = (θ + fθ)/(1 + fθ) in Fig.2. In both cases, the values
of four parameters are fixed. N = 500, M = 2, S = 10,
and θ = 0.3. The values of the remaining parameters can be
adjusted in the range of 0.04 ≤ γ ≤ 0.14, 0.01 ≤ κ ≤ 0.1,
0.1 ≤ ρ ≤ 0.5, and 0 ≤ f ≤ 1. The probability distributions
for random variables Z, Y , X , and v are assumed as follows
in this study.
Funds transfer between banks are found highly hetero-
geneous in CHAPS of the United Kingdom[22], e-MID of
Italy[26], Fedwire of the United States[24], BOJ-Net of
Japan[27], and worldwide[5]. The nodal degree of the network
and the value of the transferred funds obey a power law.
In this study, Z is generated randomly by a generalized
Baraba´si-Albert model[29], [28]. This is a random graph with
the mechanism of growth and preferential attachment which
becomes scale-free as N goes to infinity. The distribution of
the nodal degree k obeys the power law P (k) ∝ k−α where
α ≥ 2. There is a significant probability of the presence of very
big banks. This is the origin of heterogeneity. Fig. 4 shows an
example of an interbank network of N = 500.
The value of a loan from the n-the bank to the n′-th
bank is determined from the incoming nodal degree kin
n
=∑
N
n′=1
Zn′n and outgoing nodal degree koutn =
∑
N
n′=1
Znn′
of the interbank network topology by the generalized law in
eq.(3). The concentration ρ increases as r ≥ 0 increases. The
value of interbank loans is a constant if r = 0.
wnn′ ∝
Znn′ (k
out
n
kin
n′
)r∑
n6=n′ Znn′ (k
out
n k
in
n′
)r
. (3)
Once the value of wnn′ is determined, the interbank loans
and borrowings are given by eq.(4) and (5).
ln =
∑
n′
wnn′ . (4)
bn′ =
∑
n
wnn′ . (5)
The external assets are given by eq.(6). A prerequisite that
the external assets are no less than the net interbank borrowings
Fig. 5. Number of bank bankruptcies as a fraction of N as a function of γ
for κ = 0.05, ρ = 0.3 (a baseline interbank network), and f = 0, 0.2, 0.4,
1 when N = 500, M = 2, S = 10, and θ = 0.3.
(en + ln ≥ bn) is imposed because the bank has already gone
bankrupt if this prerequisite is not satisfied. Then cn = γ(en+
ln) and dn = en + ln − cn − bn.
en = max(bn − ln, 0)
+ (
1− θ
θ
N∑
n=1
ln −
N∑
n=1
max(bn − ln, 0))
ln∑
N
n=1
ln
.
(6)
Every creditor bank buys protection for its debtor bank
defaults. Protection seller banks are the largest S = 10 banks
in the value of assets. The risk is transferred from small and
medium banks to big banks. A protection buyer bank chooses
one protection seller bank for individual loans randomly.
A bank chooses multiple external asset classes to make an
investment in randomly. When M = 2, Xn1 and Xn2 obey a
uniform distribution. The prices of the external asset classes are
independently and identically distributed. The absolute fluctu-
ation in their prices obey a uni-variate Student t-distribution.
The prices rise or fall randomly. The degree of freedom is
µ = 1.5. This is a long tailed distribution which is suitable
to describe a sudden large fluctuation. The amplitude of the
absolute fluctuation is adjusted so that the probability of a bank
with the equity capital ratio γ = 0.07 alone going bankrupt
can be p = 10−3.
IV. RESULT
The number of bank bankruptcies is measured under the
experimental condition in III and the systemic capital buffer
ratio is calculated in this section. Fig. 5 shows the number
of bank bankruptcies F as a function of γ as a fraction of
N when κ = 0.05 and ρ = 0.3. F decreases gradually as
γ increases. Bank bankruptcies disappear at γ = 0.14 in the
financial system without risk transfer. F in the financial system
with risk transfer when f = 0 (curve (a)) is nearly the same as
Fig. 6. Systemic capital buffer ratio γs as a function of γ in solid lines for
κ = 0.05, ρ = 0.3, and f = 0, 0.2, 0.4, and 1 when N = 500, M = 2,
S = 10, and θ = 0.3. The leverage ratio l′ for f = 0, 0.2, 0.4, and 1 are
shown by broken lines.
Fig. 7. Systemic capital buffer ratio γs as a function of γ for κ = 0.01,
ρ = 0.3 (a less strongly connected interbank network), and f = 0, 0.2, 0.4,
1 when N = 500, M = 2, S = 10, and θ = 0.3. The leverage ratio l′ are
shown by broken lines.
that without risk transfer (curve (e)). This implies that credit
default swaps have little impact on the severity of financial
contagion. F increases strikingly as f increases. Additional
loans impair the robustness of a financial system.
Fig. 5 shows the systemic capital buffer ratio γs under the
same experimental condition as that for Fig. 5. The systemic
capital buffer ratio is close to the leverage ratio l′ in eq.(2).
The core tier 1 ratio t′ in eq.(1) is an optimistic estimate as an
effective loss absorbency capability obviously since t′ = 1.43l′
for f = 0 and t′ = 1.3l′ for f = 1. Large leverage ratio is
Fig. 8. Systemic capital buffer ratio γs as a function of γ for κ = 0.1,
ρ = 0.3 (a more strongly connected interbank network), and f = 0, 0.2, 0.4,
and 1 when N = 500, M = 2, S = 10, and θ = 0.3. The leverage ratio l′
are shown by broken lines.
Fig. 9. Systemic capital buffer ratio γs as a function of γ for κ = 0.05,
ρ = 0.1 (a less heavily concentrated interbank network), and f = 0, 0.2, 0.4,
and 1 when N = 500, M = 2, S = 10, and θ = 0.3. The leverage ratio l′
are shown by broken lines.
a vital backstop of a financial system while the core tier 1
ratio cannot be a predictor of the absolute severity of financial
contagion. This implies that the risk transfer cannot make the
risk weight of any interbank loans negligibly small.
Fig. 7 shows the systemic capital buffer ratio γs for
κ = 0.01 and ρ = 0.3 (a less strongly connected interbank
network). Fig. 8 shows the systemic capital buffer ratio γs
when κ = 0.1 and ρ = 0.3 (a more strongly connected
interbank network). The denseness of an interbank network
does not affect the impact of the risk transfer. The leverage
Fig. 10. Systemic capital buffer ratio γs as a function of γ for κ = 0.05,
ρ = 0.5 (a more heavily concentrated interbank network), and f = 0, 0.2,
0.4, and 1 when N = 500, M = 2, S = 10, and θ = 0.3. The leverage ratio
l′ are shown by broken lines.
ratio is still a good estimate as an effective loss absorbency
capability.
Fig. 9 shows the systemic capital buffer ratio γs when
κ = 0.05 and ρ = 0.1 (a less heavily concentrated interbank
network). The top 1 percent banks own 10 percent of the
total interbank loans, and equivalently, about 10 percent of
the total assets. The curves in this figure are very close to
those in Fig. 7. Fig. 8 shows the systemic capital buffer ratio
γs when κ = 0.05 and ρ = 0.5 (a more heavily concentrated
interbank network). The top 1 percent banks own 50 percent
of the total interbank loans. When the network is heavily
concentrated, the systemic capital buffer ratio is bigger than the
leverage ratio around γ = 0.1. The risk transfer from small and
medium banks to big banks mitigates the severity of financial
contagion. Although the CDS works under this condition, the
core tier 1 ratio is still an optimistic estimate as an effective
loss absorbency capability.
V. DISCUSSION
The key findings of this study are as follows. The leverage
ratio is a good estimate of a systemic capital buffer ratio as the
backstop of a financial system. The risk transfer from small
and medium banks to big banks in an interbank network does
not mitigate the severity of financial contagion except for a
heavily concentrated interbank network. Additional interbank
loans after the risk transfer undermine the robustness of a
financial system. Analysts have criticized that banks do not
raise fresh equity capital but just optimize risk weighted assets
to comply with the core tier 1 ratio requirement. They remain
highly leveraged. The focus of the international Basel III
capital requirements has shifted from the core tier 1 ratio
to the leverage ratio recently. In July 2013, Federal Reserve
unveiled the implementation of the international Basel III
capital requirements which request banks in US to hold a
higher level of capital against the overall assets. The judgment
of controversial risk weights is stripped out by the leverage
ratio. This study demonstrates that the shift of the focus is
reasonable from the view point of a systemic capital buffer
ratio.
The experimental conditions in III are a typical exam-
ple. But experimental conditions are not limited to those.
The interbank network topology Z may be a core-periphery
model[16] or other highly heterogeneous models. The risk
transfer pattern Y and the investment portfolio X may be
non-random. There may be a number of bank categories which
have different strategies in the investment and risk transfer.
The prices of the external asset classes v may obey a loga-
rithmic normal distribution or other long tailed multi-variate
distributions. Investigating these experimental conditions are
for future works. Further extension of the asset network
systemic risk model (ANWSER) is necessary to study more
practical financial systems including (1) such detailed terms
as maturity of interbank loans, CDS contracts, and similar
financial derivatives[9], (2) the role of clearing houses and
netting of exposures, (3) withdrawal of loans, refinancing,
and other means to raise money[17], (4) liquidity of assets,
correlation between the prices of external asset classes, and
other market mechanisms. Other interesting research topics are
the bank run in a fractional reserve banking when a financial
crisis precipitates a banking panic and the realistically dynamic
evolution of the interbank network.
Another issue is that the interbank network topology, risk
transfer pattern, and investment portfolio are not static in
reality and cannot be observed directly either. In the study
of epidemic contagion in social network analysis, the trans-
portation network and relevant parameters are inferred from
the observation on the number of patients with a statistical
analysis[14], [19]. An impending epidemic outbreak is to be
predicted. Similarly, it may be possible to foresee financial
contagion by inferring the basic structure of the interbank
network topology, risk transfer pattern, and investment port-
folio from statistical datasets and real time monitoring. Such
an analysis aids the supervisors and other relevant authorities
in designing the financial system theoretically and in making
regulatory policies in practice. This is the goal of an emerging
field of systems economics.
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